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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 1985, two officers from the Broward County Sher-
iff's Department boarded a Greyhound bus in Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida. One of the officers, Detective Nutt, carried in his hand a zippered
pouch containing a pistol. The bus driver immediately left the bus,
closing the door behind him. The officers proceeded directly to the back
of the bus to Terrence Bostick. They identified themselves, asked for
his bus ticket and identification, and for consent to search his luggage.1
During the search they found 400 grams of cocaine.2
In a 4-3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court found the search
illegal, because any consent given was tainted by Bostick's belief that
he was not free to leave.3 Since Bostick, a number of Florida courts
have mirrored the state supreme court's reasoning." The Bostick deci-
sion has also been followed in jurisdictions other than Florida, 5 and
applied in other contexts such as border searches,6 tresspass warnings,'
and seizure of firearms."
During the October 1990 term, the United States Supreme Court
1. Brief for Respondent at 1-4, Florida v. Bostick, No. 89-1717 (December 21,
1990) [hereinafter Brief].
2. Lipman, Broward Drug Case Hinges on Permission for Search on Bus, Palm
Beach Post, Feb. 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5.
3. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989).
4. Nazario v. State, 554 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1990); Mendez v. State, 554 So. 2d
1161 (Fla. 1990); Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990); Serpa v. State, 555 So.
2d 1210 (Fla. 1990) (decided the same day as Bostick); Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 351
(Fla. 1989) (decided the same day as Bostick); Smith v. State, 556 So. 2d 761 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Florius, 563 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990). But see United States v. Fields, 909 F.2d 470 (11 th Cir. 1990) (similar facts,
but appellate court upheld trial court's finding that consent to search baggage was
freely given); Anderson v. State, 566 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
5. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd 921 F.2d
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
6. United States v. Bareno-Burgos, 739 F. Supp. 772 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
7. State v. Melican, 564 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
8. A.G. v. State, 567 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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granted certiorari to hear Florida v. Bostick.9 The Court will decide
whether the Broward County Sheriff's Office policy on drug searches
breaches bus passengers' fourth amendment rights when the police
board a bus without articulable suspicion, and randomly ask passengers
for "consent" to search their luggage. The decision the Court renders
will impact on the manner in which law enforcement officers through-
out the nation may collect evidence.
The Supreme Court cannot allow police officers to continue to ap-
proach individuals in this intimidating manner. Although the United
States is fighting a war on drugs, there is no need to place the citizen in
the position of the enemy. The Court must clarify the difference be-
tween "voluntary encounter" and "lawful seizure" categories. 10 Cur-
rent standards are too vague, and applying these standards tends to
give greater leeway to the police than is necessary."
The first section of this article gives factual and procedural back-
ground leading to the court's decision as well as the rationale followed
by the majority and the minority on the court. The second section fo-
cuses on the current standards: the governmental and individual inter-
ests to be protected; and the requirements for a lawful seizure. The
third section calls for a narrower definition of the "voluntary
encounter."
II. BACKGROUND ON Bostick
On the morning of August 25, 1985, two Broward County Sher-
iff's Officers boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a
stopover in Fort Lauderdale. The bus driver immediately left the bus,
closing the bus door behind him. The officers, Detective Nutt and Of-
ficer Rubino, proceeded directly to the back of the bus where Terrence
Bostick, a passenger, was lying with his head on a red tote bag.12
The officers asked Bostick for his ticket and identification. They
admitted that at this point they did not have any articulable suspicion.
Bostick's ticket matched his identification, and both were immediately
9. 111 S.Ct. 241 (1990).
10. The three categories of police contact with individuals are: "voluntary en-
counters;" "brief, investigatory stops," the lesser level of lawful seizure; and "arrest,"
the ultimate seizure. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
11. Ambrosio, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intru-
sions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 NOVA L. REV. 273 (1987) (suspect under profile
surveillance should be deemed to be seized when initially approached).
12. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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The two police officers explained their presence as narcotic agents
on the lookout for illegal drugs. Detective Nutt then asked Bostick
whether the red tote bag, which he was using as a pillow, could be
searched for drugs. Bostick looked for "approval to another passenger, to
whom the bag belonged, and handed the bag to Nutt, who searched it.
No contraband was found. Detective Nutt then asked for Bostick's'per-
mission to search a blue bag that Officer Rubino had found on the
overhead rack. The evidence was unclear as to whether the defendant
consented to the search of the second bag in which the contraband was
found."
Detective Nutt, testified that they had entered the bus wearing
raid jackets clearly identifying them as sheriff's officers, and ap-
proached Bostick as he sat in the rearmost seat. During questioning,
this officer stood in a position that partially blocked the only exit from
the bus. Bostick also testified that Officer Nutt had his hand in a black
pouch which appeared to contain a gun. Bostick was not able to leave
the bus, as it was ready to depart, and he could only move about the
bus if the officers would allow him to do so. 15
The officers found over 400 grams of cocaine in a blue bag belong-
ing to Bostick. Bostick pled guilty and was sentenced to five years.'"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance.
However, the court agreed to certify the following question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court: May the police without articulable suspicion board
a bus and ask at random, for, and receive, consent to search a passen-
ger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the right to
refuse consent to search? 17
The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the issue as follows: Does
an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search on
buses during scheduled stops and question boarded passengers without
articulable reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the
passengers' luggage?' 8
The court answered the question in the affirmative and quashed
13. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
14. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
16. Lipman, Broward Drug Case Hinges on Permission for Search on Bus, Palm
Beach Post, February 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5.
17. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
18. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
14371991]
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the opinion of the district court. It found Bostick had been seized by
the officers and that any consent he had given to the search of his lug-
gage had been tainted by the illegal detention. 9
The Florida Supreme Court found that under all the circum-
stances, the "reasonable traveler would not have felt that he was 'free
to leave' or that he was 'free to disregard the questions and walk away.'
There was, in fact, . . . no place to which he or she might walk
away."20 The court concluded that although the seizure did not amount
to an arrest, it was the lesser form of seizure requiring constitutional
protection.2'
In arriving at this conclusion, the court looked to the area in which
the "seizure" occurred and the surrounding circumstances. Bostick was
in a bus which he could not leave because it was scheduled to depart
soon.22 Furthermore, the officers partially blocked the only possible exit
from the bus. The fact that one of the officers had his hand on what
appeared to be a gun added to the intimidation.23
Having concluded that there was a detention, the court next
looked to the propriety of the seizure. The court properly followed the
principle of federal and Florida law that the officers must have had, at
a minimum, a reasonable articulable suspicion before detaining Bos-
tick.24 By their own testimony, the officers never had any basis for sus-
pecting illegal activity.25 Thus the court's inquiry was at an end. Bos-
tick had been unlawfully and unjustifiedly detained.26
In his dissent to the majority's opinion in Bostick, Justice Grimes
admitted that he was uncomfortable with the Broward County Sheriff's
practice of routinely boarding stopped buses to inquire of its passengers
19. Id. at 1155.
20. Id. at 1157.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court compared this circumstance with that of Alvarez v. State, 515
So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In Alvarez, the defendant had already
boarded his train and begun his journey. To leave in the sense contemplated by Terry
and Mendenhall would have meant to abandon his private berth and possibly miss his
destination. The fourth district concluded that the police activity was tantamount to a
detention. However, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the fact that one would have a
greater expectation of privacy in a private berth than on a bus. Note also that Officer
Nutt, one of the officers who "detained" Bostick, was also an officer involved in the
seizure of Alvarez.
23. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
24. Id. at 1157-58.
25. Id. at 1158.
26. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158.
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whether they would consent to a search of their luggage.27 However,
law enforcement agents are permitted to board buses, and are free to
communicate with passengers.2 8 Although the location is a factor in
determining whether a seizure has taken place, he found that whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter was
a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circum-
stances.29 Justice Grimes noted that in this case, the trial judge had not
considered Bostick to be seized.30
III. CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAWFUL SEIZURE
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. . ."3 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has long recognized the right of every individual to be
"free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." 2 In other words, the fourth amend-
ment does not protect citizens from all searches and seizures, but only
unreasonable searches and seizures. 33
The basic premise of fourth amendment protection is that every
person has the right to live his life without impediment from others.3 4
However, the citizen loses this right of personal autonomy when he acts
27. Id. at 1159 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1160.
29. Id.
30. Id. In Florida, findings of fact by a trial court are presumed to be correct.
Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1982); Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d
1112, 1113 (Fla. 1976); see also Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 1985)
(presumption of correctness for ruling on motions to suppress). The appellate court
may disturb the trial court's conclusion only when there is a lack of substantial evi-
dence to support the court's conclusion. Strawgate, 339 So. 2d at 1113 (citing
Chakford v. Strum, 87 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1956)). Otherwise, the appellate court would
be improperly substituting its judgment for the trial court's in reaching a contrary
decision. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is enforceable against the
states pursuant to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Florida's constitution also provides against unreasonable searches
and seizures. FLA. CoNsT. art. I §, 12.
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
33. Id.; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
34. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1155.
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to harm another.3 5 Therefore, the state has the power to interfere with
the individual's autonomy through search or seizure when it has reason
to believe that an individual has committed a crime.3 6 This power to
interfere does fall within constitutional constraints. 7 For "It]he right
protected by the [f]ourth [a]mendment include[s] the right to be im-
mune from conviction on the basis of unconstitutionally seized
evidence."38
In Bostick, the state had a compelling interest in finding those who
traffic in illegal drugs. The drug problem affects the health and welfare
of our society. 9 Therefore, the Broward County Sheriff's Office had a
legitimate interest in finding the contraband in Bostick's luggage. How-
ever, Bostick did have a "privacy interest in continuing his travels with-
out governmental intrusion."40 He also had a well established privacy
interest in the luggage he carried during his travels. 41
The question is whether, given the government's compelling inter-
est in stemming the drug flow, Bostick's fundamental right to privacy,
and the particular circumstances of the case, the state violated Bos-
tick's personal autonomy with an unreasonable search and seizure.
In determining whether the state's interference with the individual
is lawful, courts must take into account the degree of contact and its
basis. The United States Supreme Court has recognized three main
types of encounters: "voluntary encounters," or "mere communica-
tion," which do not involve the fourth amendment; the "short deten-
tion," or Terry stop, involving some seizure and requiring reasonable
suspicion; and an arrest requiring probable cause.42 Thus, courts must
ask whether the individual has been seized, and on which level.43 But
the "central inquiry under the [f]ourth [a]mendment [is] the reasona-




38. B. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL His-
TORY (1986).
39. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 561 (1980).
40. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
11.3 at 571 (1978)).
41. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392.U.S. 1 (1968). This article does not deal with the arrest.
43. Schleuter, Survey: Criminal Law and Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 483,
491 (1988)). See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986).
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of a citizen's personal security. 44
The first mode of interference, the voluntary encounter, does not
raise any fourth amendment issues. For "[o]bviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of per-
sons." 45 Nothing in the Constitution prevents a policeman from ad-
dressing questions to citizens on the street. 46 The police officer enjoys
"the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to
other persons. ' 47 But by the same token, the "person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." 48
The voluntary encounter is considered permissible because the
purpose of the fourth amendment is not to eliminate all contacts be-
tween the police and the individuals, but "to prevent arbitrary and op-
pressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and per-
sonal security of individuals. ' 49 Therefore, as long as the individual
encountering the governmental official is free to walk away without an-
swering any questions, the state has not intruded upon the citizen's ex-
pectation of privacy. Under these conditions, the U.S. Constitution does
not require any specific justification.50
Nonetheless, once an officer, uses physical force or a show of au-
thority to restrain the citizen's freedom, the officer has "seized" him
within the meaning of the Constitution."1 The test is whether "in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." 52
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
45. Id. at 19 n.16.
46. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 33.
49. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 553. At this point, there is a brief, investigatory (Terry) stop. A brief
detention is justifiable under the fourth amendment if there is a-reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.
at 498. "[S]pecific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
[must] reasonably warrant suspicion of a crime." Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158. There is
no set standard as to what constitutes a reasonable suspicion. Instead the standard
seems to be based on a variety of factors: the seriousness of the offense; the likelihood
that the detainee committed or will commit the offense; consequences of delay; and the
extent of the intrusion. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1(d) (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAVE, TREATISE].
52. Id. at 554.
1991] 1441
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For a person to come under the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, he must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' 3 Thus, the area in which a person en-
counters the police will have some impact on whether his expectation of
privacy is reasonable, and whether he has been "seized." 54 In the con-
text of public transportation, there would be a greater expectation of
privacy in a sleeper car where one would not expect to encounter any-
one in one's own cabin, and only a few other passengers in the hall-
way.55 But the individual has a lesser expectation of freedom from gov-
ernmental interference in an airport, which requires extensive hijacking
surveillance and equipment.56
Examples of circumstances indicating a seizure include: the threat-
ening presence of several officers; display of a weapon by an officer;
some physical touching of the individual; and use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. 57 These are circumstances which might reasonably make
the individual think he is not free to leave.
There is some question as to the relevance of a government agent's
intent to detain an individual. Under the Mendenhall test, whether an
officer intends to detain the citizen is irrelevant, except to the extent to
which he conveys his intention. 58 However, a more recent Supreme
Court case, Brower v. Inyo County,59 held that a "[v]iolation of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical
control . . . .[T]he detention or taking itself must be willful . . . .[It
must be] a governmental termination of freedom of movement through
53. 1 W. LAFAVE, TREATISE § 2.1(b) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Although the Court generally identifies the pro-
tection of privacy as the fourth amendment's paramount purpose, it has also recognized
that the amendment is intended to protect other interests such as bodily integrity, free-
dom of movement, and possession of property. Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analy-
sis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 n.2 (1988).
54. Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
55. Id.
56. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
57. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16; Dunway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 (1979); 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 53-55).
58. Id. at 555, n.6.
59. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
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Although based on one or more of the above circumstances an in-
dividual might be considered "seized," these situations are not abso-
lutely determinative in and of themselves as to whether there has been
a seizure. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has failed to find a
seizure where the police officer requested production of an airline ticket
and identification."1 The court could not come up with a "litmus-pa-
per" test:
[T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so
much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a
sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable an-
swers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable
search or seizure in violation of the [f]ourth [a]mendment . 2
Hence, each court must balance these factors and determine whether
the individual has been seized.
As evidenced by the Bostick court's split decision,63 in practice,
this balancing of factors is difficult to apply. In two other cases with
similar facts involving the Broward County Sheriff's Office practice of
routinely boarding stopped buses, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the district court had sufficient evidence to warrant its
finding that the defendant had not been seized.
In the later case, United States v. Fields,64 two Broward County
Sheriff's officers boarded a north-bound bus that had just arrived from
Miami, Florida. The detectives had no information regarding the de-
fendant suggesting that he was carrying illegal drugs. Both men were
armed, but concealed their weapons under their jackets which bore the
insignia of the Broward County Sheriff's Department. In accordance
with usual procedure, the officers proceeded to the rear of the bus with
the intention of working their way to the front. The detectives identi-
60. Id. at 596-97 (emphasis in original); see also Clancy, The Supreme Court's
Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What Is a "Seizure" of a Person within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 619, 640-45 (1990)
(Brower does away with the reasonable person test, requiring officer's intent and actual
control over the individual).
61. Royer, 460 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result, but dissenting
to the portion which finds that Royer was not seized when the police officers requested
his airline ticket and identification).
62. Id. at 506-07.
63. 554 So. 2d 1153.
64. 909 F.2d 470 (1lth Cir. 1990).
19911 1443
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fled themselves to Fields and his seatmate, and explained that they
were seeking the permission of passengers to search their luggage in an
effort to obstruct the flow of illicit drugs. The detectives and Fields
diverge as to whether the defendant was informed of his right to refuse
consent. The officers found cocaine.6 5
The court took an interest in the Bostick opinion, a; well as the
D.C. Circuit's opinion in United States v. Lewis:6
The very nature of the encounter between Detective Hanson and
Mr. Lewis placed the latter in a position in which he could reason-
ably believe that he was not free to walk away. To walk away from
this encounter, Mr. Lewis, who was waiting for the bus to depart
for his Richmond destination, would have had to stand up from his
seat, work his way out of the narrow row in which he was situated,
and then negotiate his way past Detective Hanson, who was posi-
tioned in the narrow exit aisle. In effect, he would have had to
leave the bus, give up his seats, and lose his ability to travel to
Richmond in accordance with his travel plans.17
The Fields court found the Bostick and Lewis opinions disturbing,
and the court was reluctant to effectuate "the gradual erosion of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment." 68 However, the eleventh circuit was bound by
its previous decision in United States v. Hammock.69 In Hammock, the
eleventh circuit had already examined the Broward County Sheriff's
Office policy regarding random searches on buses. The court found that
under the circumstances, the defendant would have felt free to leave
the bus.70
It would appear that given the totality of the circumstances, under
current standards, a court would be justified in both finding there was a
detention, and finding there was not a detention. The standards with
which the courts are working are too vague. With Bostick, the Court
will have an opportunity to redefine what is meant by "whether the
reasonable person would have felt free to walk away."
65. Id. at 471-72.
66. 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1990).
67. Fields, 909 F.2d at 473 (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 787)). Lewis has
since been overruled. 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The circuit court distinguished
the Bostick opinion on the basis that in Lewis, the officers did not wear badges or carry
visible weapons. Id. at 1299.
68. 909 F.2d at 473.
69. 860 F. Supp. 390 (11th Cir. 1988).
70. Fields, 909 F.2d at 473.
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IV. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE "VOLUNTARY
ENCOUNTER"
The evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days, under
other flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or railways
without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals who held
temporary power in the Government. The spectre of American citi-
zens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for identification, travel
papers - in short a raison d'etre - is foreign to any fair reading of
the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This is not
Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist
South Africa. Yet in Broward County, Florida, these police officers
approach every person on board buses and trains ('that time per-
mits') and check identification, tickets, ask to search luggage - all
in the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement - to
the shocking extent that just one officer, Damiano, admitted that
during the previous nine months, he, himself, had searched in ex-
cess of three thousand bags! In the Court's opinion, the founders of
the Republic would be thunderstruck. 71
The Bostick court found that the government had "exceeded its
power to interfere with the privacy of an individual citizen who is not
even suspected of any criminal wrongdoing. ' 72 In arriving at this con-
clusion, the court was acting on its fear that these "repressive mea-
sures, even to eliminate a clear evil, usually result only in repression
more mindless and terrifying than the evil that prompted them.""3 The
Florida Supreme Court's decision seems to go beyond the facts of the
Bostick case to fears regarding police conduct in general. However, the
issue raised by Bostick is fact specific:
Whether two police officers violated the [f]ourth [a]mendment
when, as a routine practice unprovoked by any suspicion, they
boarded an interstate bus during a scheduled stop and, while the
door to the bus was closed and one officer carried a pistol in his
hand and partially blocked the aisle, questioned respondent and ob-
tained permission to search his luggage. 714
71. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158 (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
72. Id. at 1158.
73. Id. at 1159.
74. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at (i) (Question Presented).
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The Supreme Court should go beyond the facts of Bostick, and
address police conduct in general. The Court should not only clarify the
differences between the "voluntary encounter" and the "Terry stop,"
but also decrease the amount of police contact which would come
within the scope of the "voluntary encounter."
The Court needs to redefine What is meant by "whether the rea-
sonable person would have felt free to walk away." This standard, as
applied now, seems to use the reasonable person who is looking at the
set of circumstances, but is not experiencing them. For example, one
can say that Bostick should have known that he did not have to answer
the officers' questions, and that he could have ignored them.7 5 The av-
erage law student or practitioner knows this; however, the average per-
son traveling on a bus does not. Most people are brought up consider-
ing the law enforcement officer as an authority figure, and many see
the officer as the law.
It is generally accepted that citizens rarely feel free to end an en-
counter initiated by a police officer and walk away.76 If taken literally,
the test would make almost all police-citizen encounters seizures, elimi-
nating the voluntary encounter. In the place of the true reasonable per-
son, courts have constructed an artificial reasonable person, one who is
much more assertive than the average citizen when encountering a po-
lice officer. In doing so, courts have described many situations as volun-
tary encounters, when in fact, the individual could not feel free to walk
away. 77
The Court's interpretation of the voluntary encounter does not
take this view of the police officer into account. This is probably be-
cause there is an underlying attitude that the innocent person has noth-
ing to fear. Indeed, courts have asked the question, "what a reasonable
man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the
defendant's shoes."' 78 Nonetheless, in deciding "whether a reasonable
person would feel free to walk away," courts must necessarily remem-
75. "All he had to do was to literally say 'no' to the officers." Palm Beach Post,
February 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5 (quoting Joan Fowler, Assistant Florida Attorney
General).
76. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: the Need for Clarity in Determing when
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988).
77. Id.
78. W. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Im-
perceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1184, n.77 (1983) (citing United States v. Wilie, 569 F.2d 62, 68
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d 371, 37:3 (1969))).
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ber the average person's awe of authority, whether reasonable or not.
Anything beyond a cordial greeting can be intimidating.
This includes an officer's request for the individual's identification
and bus ticket. Currently, the Court considers such a request as a
"non-seizure. ' 79 It is only when the officer does not promptly return the
documents that he has seized the individual.80 However, the Court
should define this intrusion into the citizen's privacy as a detention, and
demand that the officer have reasonable suspicion. "It is simply wrong
to suggest that a traveler feels free to walk away when he has been
approached by individuals who have identified themselves as police of-
ficers and asked for, and received, his airline ticket and driver's
license."81
Furthermore, courts should give greater weight to the area in
which the contact takes place. A bus is a very small, often crowded,
place. A reasonable person brought up to give deference to the police
would not be comfortable refusing to answer questions while remaining
in the continued presence of an officer'in such tight confines.
In addition, if the passenger does move from his seat, he may be
acting against his own interest. A "reasonable person would fear en-
gaging in such a suspicious act as a sudden exit from a departing bus
when he is being questioned by a police officer."'8 2 Indeed, such abnor-
mal behavior would raise the suspicion of any law enforcement offi-
cial.83 In United States v. Lewis,84 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court rejected such an argument because "it is clear that a mere re-
fusal to cooperate cannot spawn the reasonable suspicion required to
justify more intrusive police methods. '8 5 Justified or not, the police of-
ficer's suspicion is raised, and the person avoiding questioning must pay
the consequences:
If she [the passenger] gets off the bus, she has nowhere to go. If
she nonetheless attempts to leave whe will probably be stopped for
further inquiry and confronted by dogs. If she refuses permission to
search she may be confronted again by police at the next stop pur-
suant to police alert. She is without any practical option except to
79. See supra notes 61 and accompanying text.
80. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503.
81. Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
82. United States v. Madison, 744 F. Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
83. Id. at 495.
84. 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 1300.
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capitulate to police demands. She is, in a word, seized. And she is
illegally seized because all of this occurred without any grounds for
suspicion. 6
It follows that any time an officer requests consent to search a
person's luggage, he is in effect detaining that individual.8 7 In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,88 the Court recognized that a search pur-
suant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible. In reaching this
conclusion, it looked to a line of cases dealing with voluntary confes-
sions.89 The Court balanced the need for police questioning as a tool for
the enforcement of criminal laws, with "society's deeply felt belief that
criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that
the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and
serious threat to civilized notions of justice." 90 In applying this balance,
it reached the conclusion that the government could present evidence
resulting from a voluntary consent to search.9 However, the state has
the burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given.92
The Court did not specifically define "voluntary." Instead, it con-
trasted voluntary consent with "the result of duress or coercion, express
or implied."'' 9 The Court held voluntariness to be a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances. 4 But the same fears of in-
86. United States v. Colthran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 158 (D.D.C. 1990) (officer tes-
tified that, when passengers refused to permit a search of their luggage, he would
sometimes notify authorities at the next stop to subject the passengers to further scru-
tiny), rev'd United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Felder 732 F. Supp. 204 (D.D.C. 1990).
87. Law enforcement officers rely on searches to introduce evidence of a defend-
ant's guilt and to prevent or curtail criminal activity. The three main types of searches
are: searches incident to an arrest; searches with search warrants, and consent searches.
L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROGENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND
QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT (The Re-
port of the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Admininstration of Criminal
Justice in the U.S.), 97-98 (1967).
88. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
89. 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 358; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 34 (1970)).
90. Id. at 225.
91. Id. at 248.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 249. Among the factors bearing on consent are: an express or implied
claim by the police that they can make the search in any event; show of force by police
at time the consent is sought - confrontation by many police officers, display of weap-
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timidation apply to the voluntary consent as to the Terry stop. The fact
that Officer Damanio was able to search over 3000 bags in nine months
demonstrates the power of police intimidation. Once a person has
been asked for consent to search his luggage, it is not likely he will feel
"free to walk away." At this point, a person should therefore be consid-
ered "seized," and the police officer should at least be required to meet
the "reasonable suspicion" standard required for the Terry stop. 6
V. CONCLUSION
The Court would be correct in deciding that Bostick had been
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The two sheriff's
officers boarded the bus and asked him for his ticket and identifica-
tion.97 They were wearing raid jackets which clearly identified them,
and one of the officers had his hand on what appeared to be a gun.98
Who wouldn't be intimidated? The Court can not possibly expect that
a person with any respect for the law would reasonably "feel free to
walk away." The Court should find that Bostick was seized, and there-
fore require reasonable suspicion of the officers.
Even without a prior seizure, the Court should find that upon be-
ing asked to consent to a search of his luggage, Bostick was seized. The
police were attempting to intrude into a private area, his luggage. Such
an intrusion should not be permissible without reasonable suspicion.
Only after reasonable suspicion has been proven should the Court look
into the validity of the consent. In determining whether the consent was
valid, the Court should look to the same set of circumstances involved
in a seizure. The Court should examine the possibility of intimidation,
even if the officer had no intention of coercing the citizen.
Although Broward County's measures may not be as oppressive as
those of Soviet Russia and South Africa, there is an unsettling resem-
blance. Intimidation is a powerful tool in authoritarian countries, but it
ons, police custody of suspect; threat to seek or obtain a warrant; prior illegal police
action; maturity, sophistication, mental or emotional state of the citizen; prior or subse-
quent refusal to consent; confession or other cooperation; denial of guilt; warning or
awareness of fourth amendment rights; Miranda warnings; "implied" consent by en-
gaging in certain activity; suspect's deception as to identity; and his deception as to
purpose. 3 W. LAFAVE supra note 51, § 8.2.
95. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
97. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
98. Id. at 1157.
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has no place in the United States. It is up to the United States Su-
preme Court to narrow the scope of voluntary encounters, and to pro-
tect the American citizen from these oppressive measures.
Margaret Fanjul Montalvo
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